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I’d like to start by highlighting a few illustrative disabling 
encounters. Then I’d like to consider whether any insights into 
what goes on within these encounters can be gained from 
existential philosophy.  
There’s a branch of the Accessorize fashion shop near where 
Emmeline lives, but she doesn’t often go there, though she 
likes the chain. That’s because the assistant in this particular 
shop invariably greets her “Hello, Trouble!” Emmeline is a 
wheelchair user who is 36 and has a doctorate from University 
College London. Last time she went to the shop, a few months 
ago, the assistant kept her waiting for ages while she served a 
number of other customers. Finally she turned and said to 
Emmeline “Just teasing - I wouldn't really forget about you!” 
For some reason the assistant seems to think they are playing 
a game. It’s completely baffling. 
Alice had just about finished her weekly shop when she 
remembered she had not got her cherry tomatoes. She hurried 
to the back of the shop to the fruit and veg section and was 
approached by a middle-aged woman who asked “What’s 
wrong with your legs?” She felt a little nonplussed at the 
woman’s directness, but nevertheless found herself explaining 
her impairment. She was left afterwards feeling unsure about 
what made it okay for this to happen. 
I recall the time – twenty years ago now, when I was thirty – 
when I’d escorted the official from the Sports and Arts 
Foundation to the venue of his next meeting. He was visiting 
Newcastle and didn’t know his way around. I’d finished my 
last meeting and was going that way anyway, so offered to 
show him. As we reached his destination I made to leave, 
saying “There you go, mate.” He reached into his pocket, drew 
out a pound, and replied “Here you are, son. Buy yourself 
some chocolate.”  
Encounters like these – which take place everywhere all the 
time and are part of disabled people’s everyday experience of 
life but have, perhaps, been little commented on - involve 
confrontation with the absurdity of life. You’re in a state of 
unreflective consciousness, caught up in the stream of what 
you’re doing, what you’re thinking, what’s going on, when 
some non-disabled person imposes themselves and brings 
back home to you the fact that there’s an enormous gulf 
between the self-you-think-you-are and the self-they-think-
you-are. You’re busy relating to yourself as a complex 
individual. They see you as someone whose primary 
significant characteristic is that you’ve got something ‘wrong’ 
with you. From a situation a moment ago where you were a 
being-in-the-world you are reminded of your fundamental 
separateness from the world, of your aloneness in a cold 
universe. 
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You are taken aback at what’s been said and at the 
assumptions being made about you. It’s disconcerting, 
annoying, upsetting, and can be temporarily confusing as you 
try to figure out where they’re coming from and how to 
respond. It’s difficult, because often while the words 
themselves haven’t actually been intended to be offensive, the 
layers of meaning that underlie them carry a weight of 
oppression. Yet it is during encounters like these, in the flow 
and flux of life, that you have to choose who you are and who 
you want to become. 
Titchkosky and Michalko (2014:101) have described disability 
as ‘a life that is lived in the midst of the meanings given to it’. 
Disabling encounters involve the imposition of a dominant 
understanding, a view which regards impairment as 
unfortunate, regrettable difference; and involve expectations 
that you will give your assent and act out your part 
accordingly as the grown-up child, the object of fascination, 
the compliant cripple. Reeve (2014) uses the term psycho-
emotional disablism to describe the reasons why many 
disabled people internalise the values which oppress them and 
identify their own embodiment as the cause of the unwelcome 
intrusions and banal comments they receive. It is very easy 
when you tend to experience these things as individuals – 
when you’re on your own - to imagine that they happen 
because of who you are as an individual. It is tempting to try 
and distance yourself from your impairment, to try and act as 
if this is something of minor significance to your life 
experience or something you’ve transcended.  
What I’d like to explore in this paper is this question: can 
existential ideas offer any insight into what goes on in such 
encounters or on how they might be responded to? 
As Kotarba (2009:140) describes it, existentialism is a 
sensibility, a way of life, a passion for living, an orientation to 
the flux and emergence of actual lived experience. It involves 
an alertness to being in the here and now, and rests on a 
number of assertions.  
Among these are that human beings are not fixed selves; that 
we are what we choose to become; and that we have 
responsibility for who we become. In opposition to essentialist 
approaches, which argue that we arrive pretty much ready-
made with a specific set of dispositions when we are thrown 
into the world (so that the rest of our lives involve a 
development of what was there at the beginning), 
existentialists argue that we are not determined solely by 
where we have been - but that we become ourselves through 
the decisions and choices we make as we go through life. We 
are constantly making sense of ourselves and figuring out who 
we are. Our identity and characteristics are a consequence – 
and not causes – of the choices we make. As Sartre (2007:22) 
says, ‘Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself’.  
Of course, this choosing ourselves doesn’t take place outside 
the social contexts in which we find ourselves. Facticity places 
limitations on our freedom. We are always in a given world, 
with other people, and in situations which govern our 
experience. The problems and choices we are faced with need 
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to be made sense of in their cultural, social and political 
settings. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms (in Kotarba, 1984), our 
becoming must be grounded in the real (social) world if we 
have any intention of coping with the given world.  
Another major theme of existential philosophy involves our 
awareness of death, of the fact that one day soon we must die. 
It is this knowledge that makes life – brief and conflict-ridden 
– so inexpressibly important. It is all we’ve got. It is also this 
knowledge that makes anxiety a fundamental human 
characteristic: we are filled with conflict between potential 
and limitation. Heidegger (2005) explains, however, that this 
anticipation of death is not to be resented and avoided; rather, 
anxiety in the face of death brings an unshakeable joy – an 
awareness of the crazy, paradoxical nature of what we’ve got 
just by being here. Existentialists say that we each have a 
responsibility to take hold of ourselves and make ourselves 
count. What others say we are, or should think or do is, in the 
face of death, revealed as irrelevant.  
 Existentialists regard modern society as characterised by 
alienating structures that enforce conformity and prevent 
people from relating authentically towards themselves, from 
thinking about, understanding and realising their potential. 
Capitalism has little need for free individuals, it needs 
disciplined and docile populations who identify themselves as 
consumers, continually purchasing goods to sustain their 
‘strategic image presentation’ (Lodziak, 2003:58); or who 
invest their time and energy in keeping up appearances and 
maintaining a narrative which says that ‘all is well with us... 
we are decent and reasonable’.  In De Beauvoir’s (1997:295) 
terms, for example, ‘one is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman’. Within patriarchal culture, being a woman is not so 
much a biological fact as it involves playing a role and being 
and conforming to what is socially expected. A similar point 
can be made in relation to disability: one is born with 
impairment or acquires impairment, but being a disabled 
person is part of a social process which involves becoming 
what one is required to be (Cameron, 2014a).  
 Moreover, as Sartre (2007) points out, humans have a 
tendency to be ambivalent about their own freedom and 
responsibility. Rather than acknowledge the responsibility 
involved in being an existing self, many choose not to think for 
themselves, but opt for the relative security and comfort 
provided by being part of what Heidegger has termed a ‘They’ 
(Wartenberg, 2013). Being the same as others, thinking the 
same things, doing things because it’s what the others do and 
expect; holding ready-made opinions and attitudes circulated 
by the media, filling your life with meaningless distractions. 
These are ways of avoiding having to think about and deal 
with the difficult and challenging aspects of what being 
human is about, of trying to escape existential anxiety 
(Cameron, 2014b). 
The downside of being part of a They is that it involves 
conforming to a set of norms, leading to a disquieting 
awareness of having settled for less than one has the potential 
to be: of making do with mediocrity. Nobody likes owning to 
mediocrity, and consequently identifies others outside the 
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norm as inferior in order to give himself a feeling of 
superiority at least to someone.  Sartre explains anti-Semitism 
in this way and de Beauvoir sexism (Wartenberg, 2013). I’d 
suggest that we can explain disablism, and the condescending 
judgements expressed within disabling encounters, in this way 
too. 
Finally, does existentialism offer any insight into how, as 
disabled people, we might respond to disabling encounters?  
Camus (2005) asks us to consider Sisyphus – condemned by 
Zeus to eternally roll a large rock up a mountain. He suggests 
that we should think of Sisyphus as happy because he scorns 
Zeus. Explaining Camus’ proposition, Wartenberg (2013:119) 
says of Sisyphus: 
His scorn for Zeus and the fate to which he has been 
consigned allows him to take control of his own 
situation… Zeus may be able to condemn him to an 
eternally unachievable task, but he doesn’t control 
Sisyphus’ mind. Sisyphus doesn’t identify himself as 
the victim of a cruel fate, but chooses to interpret his 
situation differently… Although his scornful reaction is 
predicated on his realisation that he will never succeed 
at his task, he has freed himself from a sense of defeat 
and succeeded at what Camus calls ‘living in the 
absurd’. 
Taking an existentialist perspective involves regarding the 
meanings others seek to impose as irrelevant. Disabled people 
who reject mainstream assumptions that impairment can only 
be related to negatively – regarded as something to be 
endured or overcome – are in the business of deciding for 
themselves what matters. An affirmative view which says 
‘Impairment might be messy, painful, inconvenient, but it’s an 
important part of who I am and I’m not prepared to apologise 
for it,’ is one which challenges the meanings dominant culture 
seeks to impose through the microcosmic experience of 
disabling, invalidating encounters. To scorn the requirement 
to be normal (rather than necessarily the person conveying 
the normalising judgement) allows us to come out of those 
situations with self-respect intact. As Camus says, the absurd 
can be transcended by rebelling, by saying ‘no’. 
Tony recently went to buy train tickets at Euston Station. This 
was a straightforward transaction. As he thanked the sales 
assistant and was about to turn to go, the sales assistant 
looked across and asked him “What’s wrong with you?” Tony 
did the usual confused look and then replied “There is nothing 
wrong with me. On the contrary, I am delighted with the 
excellent deal you have given me.” As usual in these situations 
the sales assistant didn’t get the point, and continued “No, 
why are you in the wheelchair?” Tony patiently explained that 
he uses a wheelchair because he had a spinal injury years ago, 
but that there is nothing wrong with him.  
In conclusion, I’d like to emphasise that what I’m talking 
about isn’t just about ‘having the right attitude’. As the 
disabled comedian Stella Young (2014) says on ‘inspiration 
porn’, no amount of smiling ever removed a flight of stairs. 
Taking on an existential perspective as a disabled person 
5 
 
involves recognising your own responsibility for addressing 
the barriers which exclude. It implies activism. Sartre (2007) 
argued that in choosing for yourself you’re choosing for 
everybody. This involves the right of everybody to their own 
embodiment, gender, class, ethnicity, sexuality, age. The 
interactionist Goffman (1990) may have suggested that it was 
for ‘the bearers of spoiled identities’ to take responsibility for 
other people’s reactions to their difference, but I would 
contend rather that they have a responsibility to refuse to 
assent to the idea that they have spoiled identities.  
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